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I. INTRODUCTION
The premise of Professors Daniel Ho and Kevin Quinn's "Viewpoint
Diversity and Media Consolidation: An Empirical Study" is a repeated
assertion. They believe that the claim that media consolidation reduces
viewpoint diversity (the "convergence hypothesis") "forms the empirical
bedrock" of federal regulation for restricting media consolidation1
(presumably beyond what would be independently required by antitrust
law). The FCC's ownership rules, they say, "[a]t heart... rest on... the
'convergence' assumption.",2 Given this premise, they apply innovative
statistical techniques to a sample of five cases to show that mergers do not
* Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law and Professor of Communication,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. Daniel Ho & Kevin Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media Consolidation: An
Empirical Study, 61 STAN. L. REv. 781, 789 (2009).
2. Id. at 784.
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correlate with reductions of viewpoint diversity.3 On this basis of having
"challenge[d] long-held assumptions about viewpoint diversity,"4 they
conclude that their findings justify cautious relaxation of existing
ownership restrictions.' Specifically, Ho and Quinn use statistical
techniques to categorize editorial positions on Supreme Court opinions as
liberal or conservative. 6 They then analyze editorial positions about these
Court decisions taken by papers before and after five mergers-for
example, the merger of New York Times and the Boston Globe-and find
no systematic reduction of viewpoint diversity.
Their study is subject to a number of obvious methodological
criticisms, some of which Part III.A addresses. The primary problem,
however, is that they are simply wrong in their basic assumption that the
"convergence" hypothesis provides the main policy basis for ownership
restraints. Three other concerns, which I have presented elsewhere 7 and
summarize in Part II, provide the primary grounds to oppose media
mergers. Their empirical study, consequently, is entirely irrelevant to
appropriate reasons to oppose media concentration. Proper attention paid to
the three most relevant concerns shows that any reliance on Ho and
Quinn's study in policy debates would simply be perniciousness. To drive
this point home, Part III.B explains why the quantitative amount of
viewpoint diversity, which they purport to measure, is not even to be
valued in itself-though how diversity or similarity of viewpoints develops
is a proper policy concern relevant to why source (but not viewpoint)
diversity matters. Part III.C concludes by speculating about causes of Ho
and Quinn's mistake of focusing on viewpoint diversity-comments
3. Only "correlate" because the authors do not claim to show any causal relation.
Based on their more qualitative investigation, they suggest that whether convergence or
increased divergence of viewpoint occurred after consolidation appeared to be caused by
exogenous factors, in particular the "personalities, leadership and organizational structure of
the editorial board." Id. at 860. In any event, a correlation based on a sample size of five that
do not point the same direction meets few standards of statistical significance, a problem
exacerbated by lack of controls or attempts to hold alternative factors constant.
4. Id. at 786.
5. Id. at 858-59.
6. Id. at 812-22.
7. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY
OWNERSHIP MATrERS (2007). In less structured form, these three arguments are often found
in policy debates, though one complaint about the huge number of people on both the right
and left who have opposed relaxation of merger policy is that they often have been
comparatively inarticulate about their objections-with the thought that merely pointing to
the size of media conglomerates suffices as an argument. I presented the arguments made in
Part I in roughly the form offered here in testimony to the FCC (June 2007), in an informal
dinner presentation to a Committee of the British House of Lords (Sept. 2007), and in
testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee (Sept. 2004).
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intended as a cautionary tale about the use and abuse of positivist empirical
analyses.
II. RATIONALES FOR OWNERSHIP DISPERSAL
The three major reasons to oppose media concentration in general,
and mergers in particular, can be labeled: (i) the democratic distribution
value; (ii) the democratic safeguard value; and (iii) the media quality value,
cashed out as an objection to a bottom-line focus. The first two reasons, I
suspect, represented the primary-but usually unarticulated--concerns of
the public when nearly two million people wrote to oppose the FCC's
recent relaxation of concentration restraints,8 while the third often finds
expression, with various levels of articulation, among editors, journalists,
artists and others in the media professions. I describe the logic of each in
turn.
A. Democratic Distribution or Dispersal
A central premise of most normative theories of democracy is that
democracy should constitute a wide, roughly egalitarian, sharing of
political power. With a dire reference to the "unanimity of the graveyard,"
the Court asserts that here "[a]uthority ... is to be controlled by public
opinion, not public opinion by authority."9 This basic democratic premise
leads to the formal equality embodied in the Court's "One Person, One
Vote" requirement ° Judicial resistance to a constitutional claim that
political equality should be substantive and not merely formal does not
reject the normative claim. Rather, the Court correctly recognizes that,
because the proper form of substantive equality is democratically
contestable, because substantive equality can never be fully realized,
because moves in that direction necessarily involve institutionally complex
trade-offs, and because some of the ways used to advance this value
themselves create constitutional problems," the claim should not have
constitutional status.'
2
8. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 386 (3d Cir. 2004).
9. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
10. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
11. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Courts take contrasting views on the
permissibility of restricting corporate power. Compare Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), with McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). This is not
the place for me to take up the vexed issue of campaign finance, but see C. Edwin Baker,
Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.REv. 1 (1998).
12. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986); see also C. Edwin Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed
Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1072-84 (1980).
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The egalitarian premise that justifies the formal one person, one vote
requirement also applies to voice within the public sphere. Voice, more
than vote, creates public opinion and provides the possibility of
deliberation. It is likewise clear that the media is the central institution of a
democratic public sphere. These observations lead inexorably to the
recommendation of a maximum dispersal of media power,13 power
represented ultimately by ownership.'
4
Various caveats to this "equal voice" goal exist-and I note three
crucial ones. First, not everyone has the same ability or, possibly more
important, the same desire to engage in significant, regular public
communication. Moreover, media would not be "mass" without
specialization in "voice." We would simply have babble-everyone talking
ineffectively. Thus, the democratic distribution value of maximum
dispersal must not overwhelm the competing value of allowing effective
speakers to amass large audiences. Still, the significance of allowing
effective media speech does not, in any way, require that a single owner
should own multiple media entities. Rather, it only recommends against
legal limits on any individual entity's appealing to-and obtaining-an
audience of great size. The practical goal should be to assure a dispersal of
ownership that leaves everyone able to experience some media as her
own-as speaking for her or to her concerns-and thus able to view herself
and her views as fairly included in public discourse.
Second, increasing ownership dispersal always works in the direction
of equalizing the distribution of media power among groups. Nevertheless,
reasonably advancing this aim often requires other policy measures. The
market might result in all or, more likely, many of the inherently limited
number of people who control media entities being people with similar
values, experiences, and perspectives. Therefore, with demographic
commonalities often serving as rough markers, government policy should
aim to disperse ownership among those coming from different groups that
are salient in public life.'"
13. The reply that appropriate dispersion of power exists because the market responds
to consumer demands might be advanced. The reasons to reject this suggestion take this
comment far afield. But see C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY (2002)
(describing primary ways that the market, even if generally effective at responding to
consumer preferences, systematically fails to give audiences the media content they want).
Still, most people intuitively recognize not only that the market criterion of "one-dollar/one-
vote" differs from the democratic ideal of "one-person/one-vote." They also recognize that,
even though any effective speaker-including media speakers-cannot totally ignore their
addressees, the media are still left with huge discretion as to what to say.
14. I put aside good policy arguments for an alternative or additional response: a partial
legal separation of ownership and editorial control that is required by some European
democracies. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 180-81.
15. Cf Metro Brdcst. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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Third, on "republican" or deliberative democracy premises, some
media may usefully aim to embody society-wide discourses.' 6 Thus, legal
efforts to assure that different voices are represented within each of these
broadly aimed media entities may be appropriate.' 7 Still, despite the
caveats, a central reason to favor media ownership dispersal is to broaden
the distribution of voice within the democratic public sphere.
B. Democratic Safeguards
Possibly most obvious among the benefits of ownership dispersal are
the various safeguards it creates for democracy. Four are noted here.
First, dispersal helps avoid the danger of demagogic power-the
"Berlusconi effect."' 8 Although the primarily economic interests behind
most media conglomerates often work against concentrated media power
being leveraged into demagogic political power, the existence of this
concentrated power within the public sphere creates a real danger of abuse.
No democracy should accept that risk. Even if, in the past, the risk had
never led to bad results (which would make the danger hard to measure by
normal statistical techniques), good institutional design-like good
structural design of nuclear power plants-should not unnecessarily risk
calamitous results. In fact, at least since the first major German media
conglomerate supported the rise of Hitler,' 9 various countries and, often,
communities in countries that have both important local media and
politically significant local or state governments, have experienced
demographic abuse of the concentrated power implicit in conglomerate
media ownership.
Second, dispersal simply results in more people with power to set
directions and determine the energy that a media entity puts into being a
watchdog, exposing both the incompetence and malfeasance of the
16. From a British perspective, James Curran recommends this role for public
broadcasting. James Curran, Rethinking Media and Democracy, in MASS MEDIA AND
SOCIETY 120-54 (James Curran & Michael Gurevitch, eds., 3d ed., 2000).
17. BAKER, supra note 13, at 143-53 (describing the need of "complex" democracy for
both media that perform a "republican" societal-wide discourse role and media that provide
for a "liberal" pluralist role with different media relating to different societal groups).
Jerome Barron proposed improving the fairness of societal-wide discourse when
recommending an access right. Jerome Barron, Access to the Press - A First Amendment
Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967). A plausible policy is to impose access obligations
solely on media entities that reach a certain level of dominance within a locale or as a
condition for allowing mergers. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 180-81, 186-87.
18. BAKER, supra note 13, at 18.
19. DANIEL C. HALLIN & PAOLO MANCINI, COMPARING MEDIA SYSTEMS: THREE
MODELS OF MEDIA AND POLITCS 155 (2004) (describing support for Nazis from Alfred
Hugenberg's conglomerate).
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powerful. 20 More people with this authority can translate into greater
watchfulness from a broader range of perspectives which can offer
different insights into potential problems. As the FCC explained in 1970,
A proper objective is the maximum diversity of ownership .... We are
of the view that 60 different licensees are more desirable than 50, and
even that 51 are more desirable than 50.... If a city has 60 frequencies
available but they are licensed to only 50 different licensees, the
number of sources for ideas is not maximized. It might be the 51st
licensee that would become the communication channel for a solution
to a severe local social crisis.2'
Third, simply by increasing the number of people over whom a
potential corrupter of the media must exercise power or influence, greater
dispersal of ownership predictably reduces the risk of effective external
corruption.
Fourth, media concentration exacerbates the ubiquitous conflicts of
interest problems that can undermine journalistic integrity. Basically,
responsible media entities try to maintain "church and state separations"-
where business interests do not compromise journalistic integrity. A
concentrated ownership structure can greatly and, since dispersal of
ownership is a possibility, unnecessarily increase incentives to breach this
wall. Mergers add to these conflicts in two scenarios: where media entities
combine (a) with other media companies, and (b) with multi-industry
conglomerates. They create two problems: (i) incentives to distort
journalism and independent content due directly to the owner's promotion
of its other interests, and (ii) vulnerability to outside pressure (or internal
incentives to leverage media power to influence outsiders' decisions). A
two-by-two matrix could diagram these possibilities. Here, I merely note a
few examples.
James Hamilton reports that during November 1999, ABC's affiliates
mentioned ABC's popular quiz show, Who Wants To Be a Millionaire, in
80.2% of their local news programs, while no NBC affiliate found the ABC
program newsworthy22 (scenario illustrating a-i from the above matrix).
Often, in contrast, media maintain the wall-but sometimes at a high cost.
The New York Times began an exposd series on the pharmaceutical industry
20. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Competition and Truth in the Market for
News, 22 J. EcoN. PERsP. 133 (2008) (discussing empirical and conceptual reasons to expect
benefits from increased numbers of watchdogs).
21. Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard FM and TV Broadcast Stations, First Report
and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306, para. 21, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1735 (1979) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Multiple Ownership Report and Order]. This standard of maximum
dispersal is a far cry from the FCC's recent discussions of whether or not eight independent
voices are necessary.
22. JAMEs T. HAMILTON, ALL THE NEWS THAT'S FIT TO SELL 145, 148 (2004).
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at a time when few prescription drugs were advertised directly in the New
York Times.23 Unfortunately, the New York Times also owned medical
magazines. 24  Apparently, pharmaceutical companies threatened to
withdraw ads from these medical magazines if the series continued.25
Though in this case, the New York Times resisted the intimidation, their
prudent decision to sell the medical magazines arguably illustrates the
intensity of the conflict (scenario illustrating a-ii). How often individual
media entities temper criticism of politicians not merely in order to gain
access or privileges but also to gain advantage for their other media
properties-or how often politicians exploit this vulnerability-is
unknown. The Miami Herald, then owned by Knight-Ridder, would have
been unlikely to mute criticism of Attorney General Ed Meese if not for
wanting his approval of a Joint Operating Agreement between Knight-
Ridder's Detroit paper and another Detroit paper.26 From the other side,
conglomerate ownership allowed Nixon to try to retaliate against the
Washington Post by making trouble for its renewal of broadcast
licenses 27-behavior which could induce future caution by vulnerable
media conglomerates.
Likewise, incentives surely exist for a news broadcaster, say NBC, if
owned by an industrial conglomerate, say General Electric, to report
favorably on that owner's other economic interests-say, nuclear power or
weaponry. Or Atlantic Richfield, an oil company that explicitly aims at
"generat[ing] profits" but that recognizes that it "cannot expect to operate
freely or advantageously without public approval," 28 might find it useful to
own the British Observer during the period when it was seeking North Sea
oil leases (scenarios illustrating b-i). As a final example illustrating b-ii,
Greece sought-though was stopped (I believe unwisely) by the European
Community on the basis of its free trade laws-to statutorily prohibit firms
that contracted with the government, for example, for government
23. Id.
24. BEN BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 164-65 (1983).
25. HAMILTON, supra note 22, at 145, 148 (2004).
26. JAMES D. SQUIRES, READ ALL ABOUT IT!: THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF AMERICA'S
NEWSPAPERS 123 (1993).
27. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
130-33 (1987); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasting, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 990, 1050-51 (1989).
28. JAMES CURRAN & JEAN SEATON, POWER wrrHoUT RESPONSIBILITY: THE PRESS AND
BROADCASTING IN BRITAIN 84 (5th ed., 1997) (quoting the Chairman of Atlantic Richfield).
Curran describes numerous examples of large media owners intervening into their paper's
editorial stance in order to advance their other corporate (and political) interests. Id. at 71-
108.
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construction projects, from owning media entities. 29 An obvious rationale
of such a law is that the combination gives the conglomerate leverage to
obtain contracts that the public interest requires go elsewhere or makes the
watchdog vulnerable to being muzzled by a fear of loss of government
contracts.
Many more illustrations could be found. Nonetheless, empirical
measurement of the effect of interest conflicts is predictably uninformative.
Any informed sense of the degree of danger will likely reflect a structural
examination of the possibilities of and incentives for this "corruption"
combined with qualitative or ethnographic investigations and, possibly,
quantitative surveys of editors' and journalists' self-reports, though with
recognition that ingrained, unconscious practices will often be the
repositories of the corrupting incentives. Admittedly, courageous
professional resistance-maintenance of strong church and state lines by
people committed to the integrity of their journalism-often occurs.
Positivist study of the effectiveness of this courage will be unable to
measure the costs and stability of this journalistic culture under historically
changing conditions. As well as being an unreliable solution, requiring
editors and j ournalists potentially to sacrifice jobs or advancement is unfair
when better structures could avoid (or reduce) the problem at the source.
Partial solutions, including Greece's structural proposal, are possible.
Reducing conflicts, however, clearly provides a reason to favor ownership
dispersal.
C. Media Quality or the Undesirable Bottom-Line Focus
The two-part claim is simple. First, the public benefits when media
entities forgo the maximization of profits in favor of spending money on
(that is, subsidizing) quality journalism, quality cultural products, or greater
circulation. Second, many small media entities have been willing to do this,
but for predictable reasons, most conglomerates focus almost exclusively
on the bottom line, cutting both journalists and journalistic quality. Though
simple in form, the logic of this claim requires consideration of economic,
normative, sociological, and psychological theory only briefly noted here.
Even if markets-as their fans hope-generally lead to efficient or
otherwise socially desirable results, this is predictably not true in the media
context.30 The mass media generally, and their creative and journalistic
inputs in particular, regularly produce huge positive or negative
29. Interview with Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, Author (June 2005).
Papathanassopoulos is the author of a Greek-language book, TELEVISION IN THE 2 1 sT
CENTURY (Kastaniotis Editions, 2005).
30. The economic claims in this and the next paragraph are developed in BAKER, supra
note 13.
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externalities that can be catalogued. A market orientation systematically
generates inadequate incentives to produce socially desirable amounts of
media products creating positive externalities-with the converse point
applying to the overproduction of content (or use of practices) having
negative externalities. Particularly of note here are the potential positive
externalities related to the democratic process. As an example, consider
that Mary, who does not read the newspaper or watch the news, benefits
when Joe does and himself becomes a more informed or adequately
motivated voter. This is because Mary also benefits from good government
and loses due to bad government. (This proposition about the benefits of
accurate, relevant knowledge can be accepted even by those who disagree
about when government is good or not.) Mary also benefits when the media
uncovers and reports malfeasance or non-performance that leads to
corrective governmental (or corporate) action.3" And she benefits when the
media's reputation for quality journalism and effective investigative
reporting deters malfeasance or non-performance even though this
reputation and deterrence dyad results in the media entity not even having a
story to sell in the market.
Any good editor will correctly assert that with more journalistic
resources, she can offer better journalism-more significant, more accurate
and more complete reporting and exposds. Though costly, the public often
benefits (the positive externalities noted above) more from the editor
having these resources than the media entity loses from its bottom line.
Before moving to a policy conclusion, one other important fact about
the media must be noted. The media-in particular, broadcasting and
newspapers-have historically been and largely continue to be very
profitable, at least on an operating basis. (Recently, newspaper profits have
plummeted not only as they always do due to withdrawal of advertising
during a recession, but also more problematically in the long term as
advertisers flee to online sites. Most daily newspapers, however, can still
be very profitable on an operating basis, with the industry's gravest
problem in relation to the entities' net profits being that the most recent
purchaser must use operating profits to pay huge debts generated by its
high purchase bid.32) Reasons for this high profitability are multiple, but
31. DAvID L. PROTESS ET AL., THE JOURNALISM OF OUTRAGE: INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING
AND AGENDA BURNG IN AMERICA (1991) (enthnographic study of how investigative
journalism generates corrective responses).
32. Though older data clearly support the claim of great profitability, this claim might
seem naive today. Some newspapers, no longer able to make debt payments, are declaring
bankruptcy. A few major dailies have closed or are ending their print editions (e.g., Rocky
Mountain News and Seattle Post-Intelligencer). Lay-offs are rampant and accelerating, with
many newspapers over the last few years reducing their newsroom count from 30% to 50%.
C. Edwin Baker, Shoptalk: Where Credit is Due, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Mar. 1, 2009. Given
the reduction in the quality of the news product due to less journalistic inputs, a decline in
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readership might be expected-and is often claimed (and blamed on young people) as paper
circulation has declined. See also PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF
THE NEWS MEDIA (2008), http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.com/2008/.
Actually, however, readership is apparently up, reaching 77% of adults, including
65% of those between 18 and 24 in a given week but with a much greater portion of these
online where they provide newspapers about 5% of advertising revenue per reader as do
print edition readers. Richard Perez-Pena, Paper Cuts - An Industry Imperiled by Falling
Profits and Shrinking Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at C-1; see also NEWSPAPERS ASS'N OF
AM., WHY NEWSPAPERS? THEY ADD VALUE FOR ADVERTISERS (2008), available at
http://www.naa.org/docs/TrendsandNumbers/Why/20Newspapers%202008%20FINAL.
pdf; NEWSPAPERS ASS'N OF AM., NEWSPAPER FOOTPRINT (2007), http://www.naa.org/docs/
TrendsandNumbers/NAANewspaperFootprint.pdf. Papers apparently even now know how
to maintain print circulation, see Philip Meyer, The Influence Model and Newspaper
Business, 25 NEWSPAPER RESEARCH J. 66 (2004), but mostly find the expenditures in quality
do not produce enough revenue to be profitable.
Even in crisis, however, most papers continue to generate the profits that owners
who did not recently incur huge debt to buy the paper could use to spend on quality
journalism. Admittedly, profits are down in newspapers everywhere and in individual cases
may not even be generating operating profits. See PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM,
THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA: NEWSPAPERS (2009), available at
http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/2009/narrative newspapers intro.php?media=4
("operating margins are dropping and now [in 2008] average in the mid to low teens"). Still,
as for now, and as for the last one hundred years, an obituary primarily applies only for
papers in dwindling number of cities that had maintained competing dailies or other special
cases-non-dominate national papers like the Christian Science Monitor without a local
base. That is, most actual closures are in two newspaper cities where papers have been
closing and competition has been unsustainable for the last 100 years. See C. EDWIN BAKER,
ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994). Most bankruptcies reflect not lack of
operating profits but excess debt created by overly-optimistic recent purchasers. Thus, in a
world economy where few businesses have double-digit operating profit rates, evidence
suggests newspapers in general remain profitable-just not as profitable as before or
profitable enough to pay the debt created by recent purchases made under more optimistic
predictions and not with the increasing earnings that would support stock prices with high
earning multiples.
For example, when the New York Times headlined Gannett to Cut 10% of Workers
as Its Profits Slip, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008, at BI 1, Gannett's third quarter report had just
reported major declines in profitability-but continuing great operating profitability. In
publishing its newspaper division, revenues had gone down to $1.36 billion with operating
expenses of $1.18 billion, leaving operating profits of $180 million or 13% margin (with
operating cash flow, which management asserts provides a better showing of operations, at
17% of revenues), down from a 21% operating margin the year before. Gannett Co., Inc.
Reports Third Quarter Results, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 24, 2008, available at
http://findarticles.con/p/articles/mi mOEIN/is_2008Oct24/ain3093291 1/.
Another large chain, McClatchy's third quarter operating profit rate was down to 9
percent, though most of this was then eaten up in interest, largely reflecting its recent
acquisition of Knight-Ridder. Press Release, The McClatchy Company, McClatchy Reports
Third Quarter Results (Oct. 21, 2008) (available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-
bin/stories.pl?ACCT=l 04&STORY=/www/story/10-21-2008/0004908224&EDA%20TE=).
The Tribune Company, although reporting huge billion dollar losses (reflecting
write downs from recent purchases), and though its 2008 second quarter revenues from
continuing operations declined 11% to $701 million and its operating cash flow declined 4%
to $114 million, still maintained an operating profit margin of over 16%. Press Release,
Tribune Company, Tribune Reports 2008 Second Quarter Results (Aug. 13, 2008) (available
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mostly reflect the nature of monopolistic competition in industries that sell
a product that has very high first copy costs and very low or zero costs for
subsequent copies. Once the profit capacity is granted and combined with
the externality point, the policy conclusion should be obvious. The goal
should be to keep or get ownership into the hands of those who do not aim
to maximize profits, but rather are committed to spending at least some of
the potential profits on quality journalism.
The owners who are most likely to favor journalism over profits
include several predictable types: (a) smaller, usually local, owners who
take identity from their firms' contributions to their community or from the
journalistic product they create; (b) workers who take professional pride in
the quality of their product; (c) non-profit entities whose goals include
service to their community. Each category justifies policy moves to
increase its ranks.
More relevant here is a category of people especially unlikely to
sacrifice profit maximization-executives of conglomerate, especially
publicly traded, companies without dominant family or in-group
ownership. 33 Both socio-psychological and structural reasons support this
prediction. These executives are particularly likely to be rewarded (or fired)
on the basis of their ability or inability to increase the bottom line. They
also often take aspects of their identity from the same profit-making
achievements. These bottom-line concerns are likely encouraged by day-to-
day interactions, not with the people of a community that they serve, but
with other executives who also value higher profits.
There are two structural reasons that make these owners not only less
inclined, but also less free to make the socially preferable choice of
sacrificing profits for journalism. First, an executive of a publicly traded
company faces fiduciary obligations and sometimes intense shareholder
at http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/08-13-
2008/0004867052&EDAT%/o20E=).
Conclusion? Crisis, yes! But highly profitable, also mostly yes. Nevertheless, the
pain is real as exhibited by continued lay-offs, reduced wages, and the situation is fluid as I
write. And this crisis, represented by huge losses of advertising revenue, partly due to the
current recession (as it is optimistically called), which always causes sharp declines in
advertising revenues, and more seriously long term, the movement of advertising to non-
newspaper online sites, and the modem end to the major newspaper subsidies from the
federal government that sustained them during the first 150 years of the country's history,
will not go away. As noted above, this leaves a bleak future that requires a thoughtful
response. See Posting of C. Edwin Baker to Balkanization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2009/01/future-of-news-part-one-problem.html (Jan. 21, 2009, 6:35 EST) (The Future of
News, Part 1 -- The Problem); Posting of C. Edwin Baker to Balkanization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/01/future-of-news-part-two-solutions.html (Jan. 22, 2009,
6:35 EST) (The Future of News, Part 2 -- The Solution).
33. GILBERT CRANBERG, RANDALL BEZANSON & JOHN SoLosKI, TAKING STOCK:
JOURNALISM AND THE PUBLICLY TRADED NEWSPAPER COMPANY (2001).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
pressure to serve the bottom line. Second, and especially important for
merger policy, if a corporate parent recently purchased the media entity,
this parent was presumably the high bidder. Its bid, based on its calculation
of the property's potential future profits, now locks the company into
producing those profits to pay the debt created by (or otherwise to justify)
the purchase. That is, the purchase-the merger itself-forces the socially
undesirable focus on the bottom line.
III. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF VIEWPOINT DIVERSITY
Part II describes reasons unrelated to the convergence assumption that
explain restrictions on media ownership concentration. It thereby denies the
policy relevance of a study of the convergence hypothesis. Here, I pursue
three further matters. First, assuming some policy relevance of
consolidation's impact on diversity, how persuasive are Ho and Quinn's
findings? Second, to what extent is viewpoint (or content) diversity, even if
not the primary policy concern, still a secondary policy value? Third, if Ho
and Quinn erred in identifying the relevant issues, can anything be learned
from their error?
A. The Study
Ho and Quinn admirably note the limitations of their study, describing
seven "caveats. 34 Anyone who accepts their premise about the justification
of media ownership policy must carefully evaluate all seven. Here, I
highlight two of the caveats that they note and also note two more which
they ignore.
The ways in which news media slant their choice, tonal presentation,
and placement of news may be more significant for democratic discourse
than the editorial positions. Many liberals have long read the Wall Street
Journal, not out of interest in its typically reactionary editorial line, but
because of its news reporting. While defending their focus on editorial
diversity, Ho and Quinn note that news reporting might be a more
important policy concern. They do not, however, give any real attention to
the reasons related to democratic discourse for why diversity in the news
might be more central than editorial diversity.3 They also ignore economic
reasons--the advantage of redeploying the same, expensive-to-gather news
while creating product differentiation with cheaply written editorial
positions--to fear that here is where consolidation creates the strongest
push towards convergence.
34. Ho & Quinn, supra note 1, at 826-28.
35. Id. at 827.
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Critics of the media seldom bemoan a paper's editorial position.
Rather, their chorus alleges slanted news presentation and, even more
importantly, misguided choices-whether due to ideological bias or
structural economic considerations36 in not covering certain stories.
Project Censored's annual identification of twenty-five major stories
largely missed by the mainstream media highlights precisely this point.37
The quality-related fear, that mergers lead to layoffs of journalists as the
combined operation tries to maximize the bottom line by using the same
journalistic resources on multiple platforms, supports a plausible thesis that
a side effect of mergers will be convergence-that is, more duplicative
content in news reports even if product differentiation occurs through
contrasting editorial content. One wonders whether empiricists' frequent
choice to focus on editorial position is driven simply by the greater ease
and objectivity of coding whether an editorial favors or disfavors a policy,
candidate, or, in Ho and Quinn's study, a Supreme Court decision, as
opposed to the difficulty of coding new-presentation slant or the viewpoint
implicit in a story's absence. The common joke about empiricists describes
a person on hands and knees looking for her keys under the street light
despite her belief that she lost them on a dark stretch further down the
street. Policy is misled if it relies on what is easy to measure rather than
what is important.
Second, Ho and Quinn note possible limitations due to their focus on
major newspapers.38 This, however, may not have been the key category
problem. Economic theory, which commonly predicts that the effects of
consolidation will be contextually variable-a prediction that Ho and
Quinn's findings support-warns against quick generalization from any
narrow band of cases. Though democratic distribution values and some
democratic safeguard concerns could find mergers among major papers
especially disturbing, economics predicts that causal consequences related
to content will be more common for mergers among media entities within a
single market. Specifically, a common economic prediction is that these
local mergers, represented by only one of Ho and Quinn's five cases (the
Atlanta papers), would be particularly supportive of a challenge to
convergence hypothesis. These mergers could produce real incentives for
product differentiation so that the combined company does not compete
against itself. This prediction, as noted above, is hardly certain.
Alternatively, an incentive to reap rewards of expertise or sunk costs could
36. In their classic critique, these structural causes are emphasized by EDWARD S.
HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT 1-35 (1988).
37. See, e.g., PROJECT CENSORED & PETER PHILIPS, CENSORED 2008: THE TOP 25
CENSORED STORIES OF 2006-07 (2008).
38. Ho & Quinn, supra note 1, at 826 (discussing caveats 1 & 3).
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lead to a convergence of content now presented on dual platforms. A quite
plausible, but substantively unwelcome, scenario would be one in which
both incentives operate. The combined local media entities may make dual
use of reporting or other news inputs, creating convergence in news, while
offering divergence in editorial lines that appeal to audiences with different
political preferences. If, however, the merger ultimately eliminates one
media entity and then offers a single source, economics predicts that, in the
absence of a competitive need for product differentiation, pressures to
maximize audience will now push viewpoint toward the center-or to a
presentation of both perspectives.39 Though this troubling scenario is
emphatically not crucial given the policy reasons advanced in Part II , its
occurrence is not factually ruled out by Ho and Quinn and in fact receives
some empirical support from their study of the Atlanta papers.
Two other limits of their study, one methodological and one
substantive, I merely note here. First, a sample of five mergers is a
peculiarly small basis from which to generalize. Ho and Quinn's study
should be unconvincing for anyone except those, like me, who already
predict what they purport to find.4 ° Second, even if media policymaking
should be concerned with viewpoint diversity, surely the relevant diversity
should be qualitative, not simply quantitative. One reason for
dissatisfaction with blogs is not that they lack diversity, but the fear that
they lack the resources for qualitative development of either information or
argument. Part II emphasized the typically detrimental effect on quality as
its third reason to oppose media consolidation mergers. The parallel
prediction is that whatever the mergers' effect on the quantity of diversity,
they will often cause the more important factor, the quality dimension of
diversity, to decline. This difficult-to-evaluate qualitative issue was not
investigated by Ho and Quinn. Failure to investigate this more important
aspect of diversity should marginalize any potential policy relevance of the
study.
B. Value of Viewpoint Diversity
No matter what a person thinks of the reasons to oppose media
consolidation presented in Part II, she might argue that the impact on
viewpoint diversity surely supplies one proper policy concern. That
conclusion, however, comes too quickly. Sometimes lack of viewpoint
diversity is not only not a major concern, but is not even to be regretted.
John Stuart Mill, while arguing for complete expressive freedom, wrote
that "the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number
39. These effects are explored in C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC
PRESS 7-43 (1994).
40. See infra, notes 53 & 54, and accompanying text.
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and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being
uncontested." 4' We are not worse off if, at a meeting of scientists, no one
pushes the flat-earth thesis. As a country, we would not have been worse
off, I suspect, if the media "converged" before our invasion of Iraq in
correctly reporting the lack of a connection between Saddam Hussein and
Osama bin Laden.42
The last intentionally inflammatory example points to both the
diversity that does matter and to a grain of truth in the concern with
viewpoint diversity-but a grain which provides reasoned support for
dispersing media ownership. The democratic quality of discourse is not
measured by the amount of diversity actually occurring-which is what Ho
and Quinn try to identify-but by (at least) three other factors: first, that
views actually held are not suppressed; second, that these views are not
subject to suppression; and third, that there are meaningful efforts to
develop relevant information and perspective. That is, what matters is the
cause and quality, not the extent, of the diversity or lack of diversity that
exists. Although these three factors were not even identified as relevant by
Ho and Quinn, the first directly relates to the democratic distribution value,
the second to the democratic safeguard value, and the third to favoring
quality journalism over the bottom line-the three factors discussed in Part
II. To return to my inflammatory example, democracy requires that, if
anyone believed the factual claims about the relation between Hussein and
bin Laden pushed by elements of the Bush administration, this view and
any facts supporting it should be presented. (Of course, if this view
received dominant play primarily because of the economics of journalist
routines or exercises of public or private power, then the play would be
problematic.) In sum, the real concerns relating to viewpoint diversity-its
quality and its actual and potential suppression-can only be empirically
investigated in a much more complex study than Ho and Quinn offered. In
fact, it can probably be better understood through informed ethnographic
study combined with economic and politic reflection on structure than by
statistically based empiricism. In any event, these three concerns with
diversity argue strongly against concentrated media ownership.43
C. Reasons for Error
I am a great admirer of empirical research. At places where I make
empirical predictions-for example, that mergers typically reduce the
41. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 53 (Bobbs-Merrill 1956) (1859).
42. Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay & Evan Lewis, Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq
War, 118 POL. Sci. Q. 569 (2004).
43. See, e.g., ERIc KLINEBERG, FIGHTING FOR AIR: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL AMERICA'S
MEDIA (2007).
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quality of media performance-I have looked to see if empirical studies
support or challenge my claim, in this case finding that, although evidence
is meager, apparently mergers did have this negative effect.44 Caution,
however, dictates consideration of whether these empirical studies reflect
not only particular historical but potentially changeable circumstances. It
also dictates a consideration of whether they adequately conceptualize the
issue under examination, remove the effects of (hold constant) potentially
competing, alternative, or additional causes, properly treat any
indeterminacy in the findings, consider alternative explanations of the data,
and so forth. No empiricist properly believes that facts speak for
themselves! In any event, Ho and Quinn's article is far superior
methodologically to most empirical studies that I have seen. Its problem
lies in its potentially misdirecting policy discussion by purporting to give
an empirical but actually irrelevant basis for deregulation. If this objection
is correct, the error of not considering the real reasons to oppose
concentration might be criticized as inexcusable, but more interesting here
is whether the error is explicable. I am uncertain, but offer four hypotheses,
the last two of which may find telling parallels in other policy contexts.
First, maybe the confusion of other scholars and of the FCC itself,
along with inconsistent, inconclusive discussions of diversity simply misled
Ho and Quinn. Since the 1980s, and especially during the last decade, as
the D.C. Circuit has become more conservative and as the FCC under
Republican leadership became more and more enamored with the market,
their statements increasingly suggest that other diversities-for example,
source diversity-are valuable only instrumentally for their ultimate
contribution to content diversity or its subcategory, viewpoint diversity.
Nevertheless, Ho and Quinn's consistent overreading of their sources belies
this benign explanation.
Many FCC policies are most explicable if based on a concern for
source diversity without the requirement of any degree of actual content or
viewpoint diversity.45 Still, Ho and Quinn would be justified in empirically
44. BAKER, supra note 7, at 35-37 (citing PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM,
DOES OWNERSHIP MATTER IN LOCAL TELEVISION NEWS (2003),
http://www.joumalism.org/node/243) (referring to various empirical studies); Stephen Lacy
& Alan Blanchard, The Impact of Public Ownership, Profits, and Competition on Number of
Newsroom Employees and Starting Salaries in Mid-sized Daily Newspapers, 80
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 949 (2003).
45. See, e.g., Multiple Ownership Report and Order, supra note 21, at para. 21. Though
the concern with minority ownership might be viewed as related to the evidence that it
produces more programming aimed at minority audiences and that this produces important
political effects, such as greater minority participation in the electoral process, see Peter
Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Race and Radio: Preference Externalities, Minority
Ownership, and the Provision of Programming to Minorities, 10 ADVANCES IN APPLIED
MICROECONOMICS 73 (2001); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Joel Waldfogel, Media Markets and
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investigating viewpoint diversity if, as they assert, the law "mandated
empirical verification of convergence." 46 Their unfortunate lack of citation
for this claim is significant if it represents a willingness merely to assume a
nonexistent legal mandate that, if it did exist, would require their expertise.
Though various judicial statements, especially by the D.C. Circuit, and the
courts' general turn toward expecting more careful, often empirical
justification of FCC regulatory policies are congenial to their
characterization of the law, I can find no specific support for their claim
that "measuring viewpoint diversity is... mandated by law. 47
Likewise, their initial evidence for the legal and scholarly recognition
that furthering viewpoint diversity is the "central animating assumption" or
the "ultimate end" is a citation to a Supreme Court case and one of my
articles.48 The Court did invoke the concern with viewpoint diversity "as
well as [an interest in] preventing undue concentration of economic
power," which in context should be read as related specifically to economic
power in the media sphere.49 But Ho and Quinn ignored the Court's
implicit approval of the FCC's description of the public interest that did not
mention viewpoint, but only source diversity-a concern with "diverse and
antagonistic sources" and "the power" "ownership [gives] . . . to select
[and] to edit,"5°--precisely the concerns with sources raised by the
democratic distribution and safeguards values discussed in Part II. The
Court even implied that source diversity might be integral to the proper
meaning of diversity when it agreed that the FCC could reasonably
Localism: Does Local News en Espaflol Boost Hispanic Voter Turnout? AM.ECoN.REv
(forthcoming 2009); Joel Waldfogel, Minority-Targeted Local Media and Voter Turnout: A
Summary, in PUBLIC CHOICE: FROM MEDIA MARKETS TO POLICYMAKING (forthcoming
2009). This point is more immediately a matter of fairness, related directly to the
"democratic distribution value" described supra, Part II. Typical arguments for minority
ownership make no presumption that actual diversity increases. This is because no
consideration is given to whether the stations for which the minority stations are an
alternative, (1) would duplicate the viewpoints or content of existing stations or (2) would,
like minority-owned stations, diverge from other stations in the area although in ways that
differ from the minority stations. The lack of concern with this question shows that the issue
was more the normative issue of fairness than the descriptive matter of measureable
diversity.
46. Ho & Quinn, supra note 1, at 794.
47. Id. at 800.
48. Id. at 788 (citing FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978);
and C. Edwin Baker, Media Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S.
CAL. L. REv. 733 (2005)).
49. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 780 (emphasis added); see
also id. at 784 (referring to both source and viewpoint diversity).
50. Id. at 785 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Curiously, when in
relation to policy Ho and Quinn used the phrase, "diverse and antagonistic," they
transformed it to modify viewpoints, not sources as in the Court's usage. See Ho & Quinn,
supra note 1, at 784.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
conclude that "it is unrealistic to expect true diversity from a commonly
owned station-newspaper combination." 5' It continued with the observation
that "[t]he divergency of their viewpoints cannot be expected to be the
same as if they were antagonistically run., 52 Thus, although Ho and Quinn
would be correct to say that the Court treated viewpoint diversity as
relevant, 53 the Court equally noted other rationales and implicitly
questioned whether common ownership was consistent with the idea of true
diversity. Only someone already accepting their hypothesized rationale for
ownership policy would be lead to find it "underpinning," or at the heart of,
the Court's reasoning.
As for an emphasis on viewpoint diversity among scholarly advocates
of regulation, their citation of my article is a non-starter. There, I criticized
an excellent article, driven by free-market ideology, by Professor
Christopher Yoo, for making the same mistake made by Ho and Quinn.
The reason to oppose media concentration is not any predicted effect on
reducing diverse content. 54 And despite Ho and Quinn's belief that their
findings "defy extant accounts, 55 I noted that no theorist of whom I was
aware believes that dispersal of ownership will always promote the
availability of diverse content.56 Certainly, evidence is weak for their
attribution of such a belief in the convergence hypothesis to scholarly
critics of media concentration.57
In contrast to the benign explanation, a cynic might claim that
increased emphasis on content or viewpoint diversity has paralleled the
increased power of conservatives within policy and judicial circles and
might suspect that this emphasis reflects the anti-regulatory advocates'
51. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 797 (emphasis added) (quoting
Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Comm.'s Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and TV Broad. Stations, Second Report and Order,
50 F.C.C.2d 1046, para. 111 (1975)).
52. Id. at 797 (internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). That is, even if
the total amount of viewpoint diversity stayed constant, the content of that diversity may
change for the worse.
53. Id. at 786. However, perhaps the strongest statement supporting Ho and Quinn's
reading is found in id. at 814.
54. Baker, supra note 48, at 735; see also, BAKER, supra note 7, at 15-16.
55. Ho & Quinn, supra note 1, at 786, 860.
56. Baker, supra note 48, at 735.
57. In addition to citing my article for that belief, they later cite other scholars as
invoking the convergence hypothesis, especially Stephen Wildman and Ben Bagdikian. Ho
& Quinn, supra note 1, at 795. Wildman certainly understands the serious limitations of any
convergence hypothesis. See generally BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO
EcoNoMics (1992). Furthermore, Bagdikian's book, even at the pages cited by Ho and
Quinn, can be most accurately read to consistently advance versions of the points made in
Part I above rather than relying on the convergence assumption as presented by Ho and
Quinn. See BEN BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY (2004); supra Part II.
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strategic choice of a battleground on which they have the greatest chance to
win. They pick up on the term "diversity," 58 popular among liberals ever
since Justice Powell invoked the concept to replace equality or fairness as
the only basis on which to defend affirmative action.59 As would be fitting
for market apologists, they then interpret diversity in commodified terms.
Their choice is strategically wise since economic theory predicts, contrary
to the assumption they impute to their (consequently misguided) pro-
regulatory opponents, that ownership concentration often increases
diversity in commodities. Unsurprisingly, the anti-regulatory advocates
thereby win the argument on the grounds that they selected-at least once
they persuade others (or, maybe merely the courts or the FCC) that more
choice among commodities is the ultimate concern.
Nevertheless, I suspect that neither the benign nor the cynical
explanation, even if each of them contains a grain of truth, tells the full
story. I suspect that the mistake of focusing on viewpoint (or content)
rather than source diversity-the latter being a more directly distributional
value-primarily reflects economists' occupational inclination to see value
in what can be purchased in markets. That is, conceptually, economists
tend to subscribe value primarily to subject/object or possessory relations.
Commonly, value is measured by how much a person would pay for
something in a real or hypothetical market-which leads to the fantasy that
perfectly working markets provide what people want. This commodified-
value focus is emphatically not logically required by the tools of
economics. Still, I suspect a study would show that welfare economists
having both a constant tendency in this direction and a corresponding bias
in their resulting political recommendations-recommendations less
concerned with distribution, with process, or even with shared expenditures
on public goods (and, hence, recommendations often opposed to greater
taxation) than would alternative orientations more connected to the
humanistic and ethnographic disciplines. But this valuation focus is
objectively misguided. Contrary to the (hypothesized) methodological view
common among economists, much of what people value in life is
subject/subject relations appropriate processes, fairness, non-commodified
relations and publicly available and sharable aspects of their community.
Looking back at the three central reasons to oppose media
concentration-democratic distribution, democratic safeguards, and quality
media content-each reflects, in one way or another, values that are related
58. As Ho and Quinn note, diversity of some sort along with competition and localism
have long been invoked by the FCC to guide its ownership policy, but they quickly put the
other two concerns aside in emphasizing their particular interpretation of diversity as a
"central animating assumption" behind FCC ownership policy. See Ho & Quinn, supra note
1, at 788.
59. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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more to people's life together than to the opportunity for efficient
purchases in a market. A more egalitarian distribution of voice represents
fairness in relations, not something sold in a market. Democratic
safeguards--concern with risk or with conflicts of interest that corrupt
deliberation-are similar process values. Consider the separation of power
theme implicit in the "fourth estate" characterization of the press. Typical
market measures provide no direct way to measure purported contributions
of separation of powers and legislative bicameralism to improving
democratic deliberations and to reducing risks to liberty. Though insurance
sometimes provides an individualistic way to "monetize" some risks,
intelligent structural design often offers a more appropriate procedure for
responding to and reducing risk. Market-based, individually purchased
insurance against the risk of the "public bad" of corrupted democratic
processes is another non-starter. Focusing on individual purchases of media
content is an overtly inept standard for whether that content-or the
process of producing it--gives the community the right amount and the
right type of protection against risks to the political order. Finally,
arguments against a bottom-line, profit-maximizing focus and for policies
directed at getting media in the hands of people who will not be ruled by
it-arguments opaque to the simplistic focus on content or viewpoint
diversity-follow only from recognizing the public goods, not simply
commodity goods, produced by media content, that is, public goods that
reflect our relations with each other.
An even deeper methodological matter may exist for which Ho and
Quinn bear no responsibility. Public policies pursue values that are
themselves based on reasons that are often contested. Interpretations of
constitutions-my usual topic-or of values and their weight, even of facts,
are always multiple. Determining the best interpretations--determining the
issues at stake-inevitably depends on usually contestable values and
reasons. Law aspires to legitimacy, which in turn ultimately is a matter of
values and reasons, not a matter of deductive logic or fact or mere
instrumental rationality. Scholarly attempts to avoid reliance on values, as
opposed to descriptions and facts, are ubiquitous. Motivations for these
attempts include a false image of science, an ingrained fearful desire of
originally untenured academics to steer clear of controversy, an immature
craving to escape uncertainty and indeterminacy, 60 or, I believe too often, a
usually unconscious realization that one's own preferred outcomes are
60. I have been plausibly accused of this one. See Steven Shiffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983). Though the critique has force, I gave reasons
for my approach in C. Edwin Baker, Sandel on Rawls, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 895 (1985). On
the importance of distinguishing uncertainty from indeterminacy, see RONALD DWORKIN,
JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2009).
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simply unsupportable in normative terms. If a person wishes to avoid these
value arenas, the likely hope, even if it is analytically false in obscuring
real issues, is for an escape to a haven of answer-determining facts or
"objectivity" or instrumental logic. Hope, constitutionally, would lie in
"original intent" rather than in owning up to a responsibility for defending
exercises of power with reasons. Methodologically, constitutional law
could place hope in "tests" that appear to turn on instrumental rationality
rather than evaluations of the acceptability of government's purposes.
Policy analysts could place hope in public choice simplifications or in a
criterion of efficiency that purportedly could give guidance, a fantasy
pursued until dashed with the realization that efficiency is conceptually
indeterminate.6'
My suspicion is that the Court's recent call for empirical evidence
while avoiding explanations of how or why it is relevant,62 an avoidance
which Ho and Quinn merely follow, and many law schools' recent romance
with statistical empiricism, following up on the Court's earlier affair with
welfare economics, reflects these impulses. These hopes of interpretative
value avoidance and tendencies toward instrumentalist reductionism are
malignant. Economics and empiricism are the easy parts of legal
scholarship, appropriate only as handmaidens to its real vocation. Legal
scholarship and inquiry, like all hermeneutic disciplines, though clearly in
need of knowledge of the world, have traditionally been at their best when
they understood themselves as value-based inquiries.
61. Cf C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFT. 3 (1975).
62. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). Cf id. at 669 (Stevens, J.
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting:
Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 57 (1995).
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